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Abstract
This study conducts both theoretical and empirical analyses of how the non-legally-
binding policies originating from COVID-19 affect people’s going-out behavior. The
theoretical analysis assumes that under a declared state of emergency, the individual
going out suffers psychological costs arising from both the risk of infection and the
stigma of going out. Thus, a hypothesis is derived that under a declared state of emer-
gency, going out entails a strong psychological cost, and thus people refrain from going
out. In the empirical analysis, this study estimates the model using a set of panel data
from regional mobility data and from emergency declarations at the prefectural level
to analyze self-restraint behavior under a non-legally binding emergency declaration.
The results reveal that, compared with the pre-declaration of the state of emergency,
going-out behavior under and after lifting of the state of emergency was suppressed
even when the going-out behavior did not result in penalties, which is consistent with
the theoretical analysis.
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1 Introduction
As of July 10, 2020, the coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) has become a global pan-
demic that has infected 12,102,328 people worldwide (WHO, 2020). To reduce the spread of
this disease and the resultant number of deaths, countries around the world have adopted a
variety of policies. In particular, as a strong measure to reduce infection, policies have been
implemented to restrict people’s activities, especially their ability to go out so as to decrease
their chances of contact. Other policies have also been applied globally to protect people,
such as social distancing, stay home, school closure, and protection measures at ports and air-
ports. Yoo and Managi (2020) argue that such policies against COVID-19 will save lives and
consequently minimize economic losses. Furthermore, Nakamura and Managi (2020) show
that reducing air travel decreases the risk of the import and export. Policies that restrict
behavior with the aim to prevent the spread of infectious diseases can be categorized into
two types: enforceable behavioral restrictions that consider penalties using the legal system,
and behavioral restrictions that do not use the legal system and are left to people’s sense of
self-restraint (unenforceable).
An example of the former is the behavioral limitation imposed by the policies of some
European countries where the COVID-19 infection had spread rapidly. France imposes fines
of between 135 and 3,700 euros if going out for purposes other than those authorized by
the government, such as the purchase of daily necessities, under the Health Emergency Bill
approved by lawmakers on March 22, 2020. In Italy, which has the world’s fourth highest
number of COVID-19-related deaths at 34,938 (as of July 10, 2020), a decree ordered a
nationwide curfew on March 10, 2020, with fines of up to 3,000 euros for those who do not
carry a “certificate” stating where they are going and why. Moreover, as of July 10, 2020, the
United States has the highest number of cases in the world. New York State, with the highest
number of cases in the country, issued a governor’s decree on March 22, 2020, requiring 100%
telecommuting. The decree imposes fines of up to 10,000 dollars if a company fails to comply
and causes serious physical harm to its employees.
1
In contrast with these strict measures against the spread of infectious diseases that pro-
hibit citizens from going out and impose severe private rights restrictions by the state with
penalties for violations, some countries have a vague legal basis for restricting behavior. This
refers to the second type of policy described above—a policy of curtailment based on peo-
ple’s decision-making, without enforcement. Sweden, which aims to get a certain number
of people infected and immunized without strict restrictive measures, recommends working
from home and only advocates avoiding unnecessary travel and social contact with high-risk
older people. Japan, which has the lowest number of cases per million people among the 36
industrialized countries in the OECD, has a non-coercive, unenforceable policy with a vague
legal basis, such as declaring a state of emergency and requesting that people refrain from
leaving home unnecessarily to control the spread of COVID-19.
Thus, in Japan, the number of going-out actually decreased after the declaration of the
state of emergency (The Japan Times, 2020a; Kyodo News, 2020). As a result, the number
of infected people is considered to have been more successfully controlled compared with
other OECD countries (Lu et al., 2020; Iwasaki and Grubaugh, 2020). However, although
these reports of reduced going-out compare the going-out before and after the emergency
declaration, they only focus on the situation in densely populated central metropolitan areas
and do not control for public awareness of the increase in the number of people infected
and the behavior reflected by it. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude from these reports
whether the declaration of emergency actually reduced the number of going-out across the
country, that is, the entire area within which the request for self-restraint was made.
In fact, the effect of these requests for self-restraint on the consciousness of the Japanese
people can be seen in one phenomenon, the “self-restraint police” (Jishuku Keisatsu in
Japanese). The self-restraint police are said to be members of the general public who conduct
private policing of individuals and groups who do not comply with requests to refrain from
going out or other activities under the emergency declaration. There have been incidents
involving these self-restraint police, such as harassing phone calls, posts about restaurants
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that were operating under the declared state of emergency (The Japan Times, 2020c), slan-
der of travelers because of their history of having COVID-19 (The Japan Times, 2020b), and
damage to cars of travelers at tourist sites when their license plate number indicated that it
was from another prefecture (The Japan Times, 2020b).
This phenomenon likely occurred because people have an aversion to those who do not
refrain from going out, even in the case of non-legally binding declarations of a state of
emergency. Thus, we suggest that even under unenforceable policies, people may refrain from
going-out with the goal of avoiding the social stigma of going-out. Accordingly, this study
focuses on people’s restrictions from going out under such a decree that has an ambiguous
legal basis, from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives.
Specifically for the theoretical analysis, we introduce a theoretical model that analyzes
self-restraint behavior in the context of spreading infectious diseases from the perspective
of stigma. First, statements such as the Japanese government’s state of emergency are not
legally binding. Thus, there are no fines or penalties for individuals who go out. Nevertheless,
most Japanese citizens refrained from going outside under the state of emergency. A plausible
reason why the declaration was valid is that most people were afraid of the risk of infection
at that time. For example, Aum et al. (2020) assume that people accept the disutility of
going out due to the risk of infection and conclude that people will stay home if they are
at high risk of infection. If this is the only reason, then the effect of restraint should be
consistent when the risk of infection is constant under the state of emergency and after it
is lifted. Could this be true? What other important factors must be considered that affect
people’s self-restraint behavior? To address these questions, we analyze people’s self-restraint
behavior by introducing stigma into our theoretical model, as well as the risk of infection, in
the following analysis.
The research on stigma has developed around social psychology Major et al. (2018),
starting with discussion the by Goffman (1963). There are several studies on stigma in
economics as well; Moffitt (1983); Besley and Coate (1992); Bhargava and Manoli (2015)
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study the stigma of accepting welfare benefits (Lindbeck et al., 1999; Kurita et al., 2020;
Itaya and Kurita, 2020). Moreover, Kim (2003) analyzes the stigma related to tax evasion,
and Rasmusen (1996) investigates the stigma for ex-convicts.
This study considers that stigma is important in analyzing the going-out behavior during
the spread of infectious diseases since stigma can have a complementary role to infection risk
in people’s self-restraint behavior. In Japan, under the state of emergency, it was a social
norm to refrain from going out. Public opinion was formed such that going out under the
state of emergency was considered to be anti-social behavior. In other words, people who
go out under the state of emergency are stigmatized as having inferior ethics in the society
because they do not follow the social norms.
The theoretical analysis in this study supposes that the individual going out suffers psy-
chological costs arising from both the stigma of going out and the risk of infection under the
declared state of emergency. Specifically, we assume that infection risk and stigma have a
complementary effect on the psychological cost to the player. As a result, the hypothesis is
derived that under a declared state of emergency, people refrain more from going out as it
entails a strong psychological cost.
For the empirical perspectives, several studies analyze the impact of Japan’s non-legally
enforceable emergency declarations on the population. For example, Kobayashi et al. (2020)
use a statistical model based on a state-space model that combines the susceptible-infected-
recovered models to predict the evolution of infectious diseases as well as includes the mag-
nitude and timing of the peak of the epidemic, following interventions by the emergency
declaration in Japan. They confirm that the issuance and extension of the state of emer-
gency declaration has been successful in controlling the COVID-19 epidemic to some extent.
Yamamoto et al. (2020), based on an online survey of prefectures where the spread of COVID-
19 infection was significant, show that actions of self-restraint based on the declaration of a
state of emergency cause psychological distress. Kawaguchi et al. (2020) use data obtained
through an Internet survey with Japanese small and medium-sized enterprises to find that,
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in the short term, the state of emergency reduces both feasible and expected sales of firms.
Qian and Yahara (2020) conduct a survey under the state of emergency and find that accu-
racy, morality, and ideology are changing people’s behavior and mental health in response
to COVID-19. Finally, Yamamura and Tsutsui (2020) construct panel data by conducting
an Internet survey with the same respondents twice, before and after the emergency decla-
ration, to analyze individual-level changes in preventive behavior and mental status due to
the emergency declaration.
In contrast with studies analyzing the impact of non-legally-binding policies such as those
described above, others analyze the impact of an enforceable lockdown on the economy (Ace-
moglu et al., 2020; Alvarez et al., 2020; Farboodi et al., 2020; Holtemo¨ller, 2020; Eichenbaum
et al., 2020; Gharehgozli et al., 2020; Mandel and Veetil, 2020; Martin et al., 2020). Martin
et al. (2020) develop a microeconomic model to assess the socioeconomic impact of COVID-
19 on individuals, estimating the direct impact of lockdown policy triggered by COVID-19
on household income, consumption, and poverty. Acemoglu et al. (2020) build a hetero-
geneous susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered model and conclude that a lockdown policy
that focuses on at-risk older groups is optimal. Alvarez et al. (2020) discuss the optimal
lockdown policy to minimize the deaths and economic costs attributable to COVID-19, using
the formulation as an optimization problem. Mandel and Veetil (2020) estimate the costs
of a lockdown in some sectors of the global economy due to COVID-19 using a multi-sector
disequilibrium model that considers the buyer–seller relationship between agents in different
countries. However, none of these studies consider stigma. In addition, lockdowns, unlike
emergency declarations, have a legal basis with penalties. In other words, they do not con-
sider the effects of looser emergency declarations that are not legally binding.
Based on the above research, this study contributes in the following ways: First, it devel-
ops a microeconomic theoretical model of people’s going-out behavior in legally non-binding
emergency declarations while considering the social stigma against going out. Second, we
estimate a macro-panel data model that combines daily data on various outside behaviors
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covering all prefectures in Japan that are collected pre declaration, under declaration, and
post declaration, as well as covariates to control for various confounding factors. We thus
measure the effect of emergency declarations on the behavior of people outside the prefecture
while considering factors that contribute to their behavior and the heterogeneity of emer-
gency declarations in different prefectures with different dates of issuance. In addition, we
compared the behavior of people who went out after the emergency declaration was lifted
with that before the declaration.
The advantage of this study’s contribution over existing studies on non-legally binding
emergency declarations is as follows: First, there is little analysis in the literature on going-
out actions associated with the issuance of emergency declarations based on ambiguous legal
systems. Second, we build a theoretical model to explain going-out behavior under non-legally
binding emergency declarations based on social stigma. Although Yamamura and Tsutsui
(2020) analyze people’s going-out behavior under a state of emergency in Japan, because
their data set is based on a questionnaire survey, there is a possibility of measurement error
due to personal memory differences and other factors. Moreover, because their study used
a sample composed of two time points—before and after the declaration of an emergency—
they did not consider changes in going-out activity after lifting of the state of emergency.
In contrast, this study conducts an empirical analysis considering the three time points of
pre-declaration, under-declaration, and post-declaration using data obtained from Google
COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, which provide more objective data compared with
questionnaire survey data.
In the following, we briefly describe the results of this study. The theoretical analysis
showed that the incentive to go out is reduced under the state of emergency compared with
that after it is lifted through the stigmatization of going-out behavior. In other words, the
number of people who go out under the state of emergency is lower than that after the
emergency is lifted. Second, in the empirical analysis, we examined the going-out behavior
under a declared state of emergency using daily mobility data for 47 prefectures in Japan.
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After controlling for confounding factors that may vary by prefecture and time, we find
that going-out behavior decreased under- and post-declaration of the state of emergency.
Furthermore, this study finds that going-out behavior decreased the most during the under-
declaration period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present a theoretical
analysis. Section 3 discusses the data, econometric methods, and analytical results. Finally,
this study concludes in Section 4.
2 Theoretical Model
Let us start by explaining the model. Consider an economy in which the mass of the pop-
ulation is normalized to 1. The player chooses to go out or not. The player’s gain is set as
follows:


uout − φ [γc+ ισs]
δ if going out,
uhome if staying at home,
(1)
where uout is the utility from going out and uhome is the utility from staying at home. We
assume that the utility from going out is higher than that from staying at home, that is,
uout > uhome.
φ [γc+ ιφs]δ is the term of the psychological cost. This cost contains two components
of the risk of infection of the virus (γc) and the stigma (ιφs). This formulation indicates
that the stigma and risk of infection are complementary in the psychological cost. Here,
φ ∈ [0, φ¯] is the sensitivity to the psychological cost, γ ∈ [0, 1] is the subjective probability
of an individual being infected after going out, c is the cost of infection, s is the stigma cost,
σ ∈ (0,+∞) is the parameter that indicates the size of the stigma cost relative to the cost
of infection, δ ∈ (0,+∞) is the parameter of cost to scale, and ι ∈ {0, 1} is the indicator
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variable that equals one if a state of emergency is declared and zero otherwise.
We assume that φ has distribution φ ∼ F (·), where F ′(·) := f(·) and f(φ) > 0 for
φ ∈ [0, φ¯]. Then, we consider the critical level of the sensitivity to stigma cost as follows:
uout − φˆ [γc+ ισs]
δ = uhome. (2)
From Equation (2), individuals with sensitivities below (above) this threshold have an incen-
tive to go out (stay home). Solving for φˆ, we obtain the following:
φˆ =
∆
[γc+ ισs]δ
, (3)
where ∆ := uout − uhome > 0.
The proportion of individuals who go out, x, is as follows:
x = Pr(φ ≤ φˆ) = F (φˆ). (4)
We suppose that the stigma cost function is based on conformism as in Lindbeck et al.
(1999, 2003). We assume that the stigma cost decreases with the proportion of individuals
who go out, that is, s = s(x), s′(x) < 0, and s ∈ (0,+∞).
We also assume that the difference of utility is higher than the expected cost of infection,
that is, ∆ > γc. When ι = 0, all individuals choose going out since uout > uhome. On the
other hand, the case of ι = 1 is analyzed as follows:


φˆ =
∆
[γc+ ισs]δ
,
x = F
(
φˆ
)
,
s = s(x),
(5)
8
x = F


∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ

 := χ(x). (6)
The fixed point of the mapping from x to x in Equation (6), x∗, is the equilibrium of this
model1. Clearly, there is at least one equilibrium from the intermediate value theorem.
We present the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There can exist multiple equilibria under a state of emergency. On the other
hand, there exist the unique equilibrium when a state of emergency is lifted as follows:
x∗post = F


∆
[γc]δ

 (7)
Proof. The slope of the mapping (6) is given as follows:
∂χ
∂x
= f


∆
[γc+ ισs(x)]δ




∆δ [γc+ ισs(x)]δ−1
[γc+ ισs(x)]2δ

 [−ισs′(x)] . (8)
There is the possibility of multiple equilibria under a state of emergency since the sign of
Equation (8) is positive.
On the other hand, the sign of Equation (8) is zero when a state of emergency is lifted.
To confirm the equilibrium when a state of emergency is lifted, by substituting ι = 0 into
Equation (6), we get the following result:
χ(x)|ι=0 = F


∆
(γc)δ

 (9)
Clearly, Equation of (9) is fixed with respect to x. Therefore, the equilibrium when a state
1The stability condition for equilibrium is ∂χ/∂x < 1.
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of emergency is lifted (x∗post) is unique as follows:
x∗post = F


∆
(γc)δ

 (10)
Proposition 1 suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria displayed in Figure 1 as an
example. This figure shows a mapping from x to x, defined as χ(x): χ(x)|ι=1 or χ(x)|ι=0,
where χ(x)|ι=1 is the mapping under a state of emergency and χ(x)|ι=0 is the mapping
after a state of emergency. There exist an equilibrium with few going-out people (x∗under;L)
and equilibrium with many going-out people (x∗under;H) as multiple equilibria under a state
of emergency in Figure 1. We call x∗under;L “strictly self-restraint equilibrium” and x
∗
under;H
“non-strictly self-restraint equilibrium,” respectively. On the other hand, after the state of
emergency is lifted, there exist and realize the unique equilibrium x∗post. It is due to the
existence of a certain complementarity that arises from the presence of externalities between
people’s behavior under the state of emergency. The Japanese case can be considered that
under the emergency declaration, an equilibrium with fewer people out and about is achieved,
i.e., strictly self-restraint equilibrium x∗under;L, and after the emergency declaration, social
norms are no longer in effect, i.e., x∗post.
The following proposition presents the results for the difference in the number of citizens
between the under the declaration of the state of emergency and its lifting.
Proposition 2 The number of players going out under the state of emergency (xunder) is
less than those going out after the state of emergency was lifted (xpost), ceteris paribus.
Proof. Under the state of emergency (ι = 1), by substituting ι = 1 into (6), we get the
10
following:
χ (x) |ι=1 = F


∆
[γc+ σs(x)]δ

 . (11)
We denote a fixed point for mapping (11) as xunder.
After the state of emergency is lifted, by substituting ι = 0 into (6), we get the following:
χ (x) |ι=0 = F


∆
(γc)δ

 . (12)
We denote a fixed point for mapping (12) as xpost.
The difference between Equations (11) and (12) is given as follows:
χ (x) |ι=1 − χ (x) |ι=0 < 0. (13)
Therefore, we get the following result:
x∗under − x
∗
post < 0 (14)
for any x ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 2 shows that even in the condition with a fixed subjective probability of
infection, the number of people going out under a request for self-restraint based on the
declaration of a state of emergency is lower than those going out after the state of emergency is
lifted. This implies that a non-legally binding policy—the state of emergency—can influence
going-out behavior through stigma regardless of the fear of infection. Figure 1 underpins the
mapping under the state of emergency χ(x)|ι=1 is never above the mapping χ(x)|ι=0. That
is, we confirm the relationship, x∗post > x
∗
under;H > x
∗
under;L.
The following proposition presents this interesting result.
11
Proposition 3 Under the state of emergency, that is, ι = 1, some players self-restrain from
going out, even if all players expect the probability of infection to be zero, that is, γ = 0.
Proof. By substituting ι = 1 and γ = 0 into Equation (6), we get the following:
χ (x) |ι=1,γ=0 = F


∆
[σs(x)]δ

 . (15)
The sign of Equation (15) is positive since ∆ > 0, σ > 0, and s(x) > 0 for any x ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, the fixed point for mapping (15) is positive, that is, x∗under > 0.
Proposition 3 suggests that some individuals refrain from going out even if all of them
thought the probability of infection was zero under the emergency declaration. This suggests
that even in the absence of fear of infection, non-legally binding emergency declarations can
influence behavior through stigma.
This section describes the theoretical analysis of individual behavior in situations where
there is an infection risk and psychological cost due to stigma. We show that requests for
self-restraint against going out based on non-legally binding emergency declarations are in
effect in an equilibrium. Notably, Proposition 3 suggests that non-legally binding emergency
declarations also affect the behavior of players with through stigma even in the condition with
a fixed subjective probability of infection. In the following empirical analysis, we examine
the results of Proposition 22.
3 Empirical Analysis
This section analyzes how Japan’s unenforceable emergency declarations triggered by COVID-
19 affected people’s going-out behavior using daily prefectural population flow data from the
Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports as well as several covariates. In addition,
2Proposition 3 analyzes going-out behavior under the subjective infection probability of zero. However,
since it is difficult to verify a situation wherein the subjective infection probability is zero in the real world,
only Proposition 2 is tested in the empirical analysis.
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we analyze how the behavior of people who went out after the state of emergency was lifted
changed compared with that before it was issued, that is, whether the effects of the declara-
tion continued after the emergency was lifted.
3.1 Methodology
In this study, we analyze the effects of emergency declarations on people’s going-out behavior
using a panel data model. Specifically, the following one-way error component model (Baltagi,
1984) is used:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit,
eit = αi + νit, (16)
where y is the dependent variable on human flow, i = 1, . . . , n is the index for the ith prefec-
ture, t = 1, . . . , T is the date, x is an explanatory variable vector containing covariates, β is
an unknown parameter vector, and e is the disturbance term. Furthermore, as in Equation
16, the disturbance term can be decomposed into stochastic variability ν and prefecture-level
heterogeneity α. Furthermore, focusing on the explanatory variable vector, it is decomposed
as follows:
xit := [d
′
it,w
′
it]
′
, (17)
where dit is a vector of target variables consisting of two dummy variables, one for the date
under the declaration and one for the date after the declaration, and wit is a covariate vector.
The model in Equation (16) can be estimated using a one-way fixed-effect estimator
(hereinafter, one-way FE) and the one-way random-effect estimator (hereinafter, one-way
RE). The one-way FE presumes the binary dummy variable for αi, whereas the one-way RE
assumes that the individual effect is randomly determined. In this study, we estimate both
and examine the estimates adopted as a result of the Hausman test.
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3.2 Data
This study measures the impact of unenforceable emergency declarations on people’s going-
out behavior in Japan. For this purpose, we constructed a daily panel dataset at the prefec-
ture level. In this section, we describe the contents of the data in detail.
First, we discuss the dependent variable yit described in Section 3.1, namely, going-out
behavior, which is the subject of the effects of policy interventions. This study uses the
Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports3 to evaluate the impact of the data on peo-
ple’s going-out behavior across Japan. Google collected these data to provide one piece of
evidence on how public health authorities respond to COVID-19. These data are anonymized
and aggregated with an emphasis on protecting people’s privacy by using only location infor-
mation from applications such as Google Maps4; in other words, the data are summarized by
region. In Japan, about 90% of the people have used map applications at least once, and the
number of Google Maps users is about 80% based on a survey5. Therefore, anonymized ag-
gregate data obtained from users’ Google Maps location data are considered reliable in terms
of representing human flows in all prefectures of Japan. In addition, these data are divided
into six categories according to the content of the going-out behavior: “Retail & recreation,”
“Grocery & pharmacy,” “Parks,” “Transit stations,” “Workplaces,” and “Residential.” In
this study, four of these six categories, “Retail & recreation” (retail), “Grocery & phar-
macy” (grocery), “Parks” (park), and “Workplaces” (workplace), are used as dependent
variables in terms of measuring the effect of emergency declarations based on the purpose of
going out. According to the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, retail refers
to going-out behavior consisting of entertainment and leisure-time purchases at restaurants,
cafes, shopping centers, theme parks, museums, libraries, cinemas, and so forth. grocery
refers to going-out behavior for activities related to purchasing daily necessities, such as visit-
ing grocery stores, food wholesalers, fruit and vegetable markets, luxury grocery stores, drug
3https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/, accessed on July 10, 2020
4https://www.google.co.jp/maps/, accessed on July 10, 2020
5https://www.value-press.com/pressrelease/215276, in Japanese, accessed on July 10, 2020
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stores, pharmacies, and so forth. park refers to an going-out to a park, such as a regional
park, national park, public beach, marina, dog park, square, garden, and so forth. Finally,
workplace refers to going-out behavior related to traveling to the workplace. In addition,
it is important to note that these movement data are presented as percentage changes from
the baseline value for each of the seven days of the week. These baseline values are defined
by the median value for each of the seven days of the week during the five-week period from
January 3 to February 6, 2020.
Second, we discuss variables that make up the target explanatory variable, dit. This
vector comprises variables that measure the status of the emergency declaration. Therefore,
we use the following variables as target variables in this study: the first is under that takes
1 on dates under the state of emergency and 0 otherwise, and the second is post that takes
1 on dates after the state of emergency lifted and 0 otherwise. The dates on which the state
of emergency was declared and was lifted differ from prefecture to prefecture. In this study,
we use date range data on the emergency declaration in Japan (Katafuchi, 2020) based on
reports published by the Office for Novel Coronavirus Disease Control, Cabinet Secretariat,
Government of Japan.
Third, we describe a covariate vector wit. As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable
in this dataset is represented by the disparity from the seven reference values on each day
of the week. Therefore, it is possible that there are seasonal differences between the five
weeks within which those reference values are defined and the sample. In this study, two
weather variables, daily precipitation (precipitation) and daily sunshine hours (sunlight),
obtained from the Japan Meteorological Agency6, are used to control for its seasonality. The
positional attributes of these data are defined by a more detailed classification than at the
prefecture level. Therefore, in this study, we treat meteorological data from the prefectural
capitals as prefecture-level meteorological data to ensure representativeness. Furthermore,
we consider that the impact of the spread of COVID-19, that is, the subjective probability of
6https://www.data.jma.go.jp/obd/stats/etrn/index.php, in Japanese, accessed on July 10, 2020
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contracting the disease, on people’s going-out behavior is present, as also incorporated in the
theoretical model in Section 2. Therefore, it is necessary to control the situation of infection
at the prefecture level. This study thus incorporates a one-period lag of the increase in the
number of infected people per million (inc positive perm) into the covariate vector. These
data are calculated using the data from TOYO KEIZAI ONLINE (2020). However, since the
data period begins from March 11, 2020, the data before that date were compiled based on
press releases by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan 7.
Finally, we discuss how to determine the sample period for this dataset. Table 1 shows
when the state of emergency was declared (emergency start) and lifted (emergency end)
for each prefecture, as well as the period during which the state of emergency was declared
(emergency length). The length of time under the emergency declaration varied from pre-
fecture to prefecture—the shortest period was 28 days in about 80% of the prefectures. In this
study, we use the mode value of the period under the emergency declaration to determine the
length of the sample period under the state of emergency and after its lifting. Accordingly,
this length is determined from the issuance to the cancellation of the state of emergency in
large urban areas, such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Osaka, as these areas had longer emergency
periods than most other regions. Therefore, we define the sample period from April 7 to 28
days prior to the declaration of the state of emergency in these metropolitan areas—that
is, March 10, 2020, is the starting point of the entire sample period. On the other hand,
this study defines the sample period from May 25 to 28 days after the lifting of the state of
emergency for these metropolitan areas as the post-declaration sample period, with June 22,
2020 as the endpoint of the overall sample period. The sample is therefore composed of 47
prefectures, that is, n = 47; the sample period is from March 10 to June 22, 2020, that is,
T = 105; and the sample size is N = nT = 47× 105 = 4, 935.
7https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/0000121431_00086.html, in Japanese, ac-
cessed on July 10, 2020
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3.3 Result
First, we briefly look at the disparity between the going-out behavior in the pre-declaration,
under-declaration, and post-declaration periods. It must be noted that each of these dispar-
ities is defined by the difference from representative value for the reference period defined
by the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports. Figure 2 shows the disparity for
retail, that is, the difference from the reference value for the going-out purpose of pur-
chasing activities related to entertainment and leisure, for the time period specified by the
declaration of the state of emergency. To show the disparity more clearly by day of the week
in this figure, we choose representative dates for each day of the week for each time period
defined by the emergency declaration, so that the status of the emergency declaration is the
same for all prefectures: March 28 (Saturday), March 29 (Sunday), and April 1 (Wednes-
day) for pre-declaration; April 25 (Saturday), April 26 (Sunday), and April 29 (Wednesday)
for under-declaration; and May 30 (Saturday), May 31 (Sunday), and June 3 (Wednesday)
for post-declaration. To further reflect the status of infection in each prefecture, this figure
groups the samples by the date of the end of the state of emergency and shows the different
shapes of the points. The three panels on the left compare the going-out behavior for retail
between flows under and before the emergency declaration, and the three panels on the right
compare the flows for retail under and after the emergency was lifted. The overall trend is
that there is more flow of people pre- and post-declaration of a state of emergency compared
with under-declaration. In other words, the flow of people for retail under a declared state
of emergency is decreasing. This is because almost all of the points are to the left of the
45 degree line. However, a comparison between Sundays before and under the emergency
declaration shows a slight increase in flows under the emergency declaration in some large
cities such as Tokyo and Kanagawa in prefectures where the declaration was lifted the latest.
Next, we look briefly at the disparity in human flows for grocery. Figure 3 shows the
same overall trend as for retail, although the number of prefectures where the flow of
people is higher in the under-declaration than in the pre-declaration is higher here. As for
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parks, except for the Saturday after lifting the state of emergency and the Sunday before
its lifting, the overall increase in the number of people going to parks under the emergency
declaration can be seen in Figure 4. Finally, for workplace, the trend is the same as for
retail and grocery. Figure 5 shows that the number of people going out for work decreased
on any day of the week under a declared emergency situation. This can be attributed to the
people’s semi-compulsory decision of not going out for work in response to the government’s
telecommute requirements. With the exception of the going out for park, the going-out
behavior in all categories decreased under the declared emergency situation. However, an
analysis controlling for seasonality is necessary for park; furthermore, this analysis fails to
account for prefecture-level heterogeneity in going-out behavior. In this study, we estimate
the panel data model described in Section 3.1 and conduct in-depth analysis of how non-
legally binding emergency declarations can affect going-out behavior.
Table 2 shows the results of estimating the panel data model introduced in Section 3.1
with the prefecture-level panel dataset created by this study. Each column represents a cate-
gory of the dependent variable, the change in going-out behavior from the reference period of
going out. Following the rule that a fixed-effect estimator is used if the results of the Haus-
man test are less than 5% statistically significant, a one-way fixed effect estimator is used
in all categories except for park. This may be explained by the fact that heterogeneity at
the prefectural level is randomly determined with respect to the going-out behavior for park,
as seen in the scatter-plot analysis described above. The estimated coefficients are negative
and statistically significant for all dependent variables, both under and post. Therefore, the
results show that, comparing the periods before the emergency declaration and the reference
value, going-out behavior decreased in both the under-declaration and post-declaration. Fur-
thermore, looking at the estimated magnitudes of the coefficients, under is smaller than post
for all dependent variables. This phenomenon suggests that under the state of emergency
declaration, people may have been less likely to go out than post-declaration, based on the
difference between their behaviors and the reference value before the emergency declaration.
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To confirm the robustness of this relationship, this study conducts sensitivity analyses.
First, results of the estimation with all covariates excluded are shown in Table 3. In this sim-
pler estimation model, a one-way random effect estimator is used in the models for the three
dependent variables except for workplace, following the rule that a fixed-effect estimator is
used if the results of the Hausman test show that a statistical significance is less than 5%.
Therefore, it is desirable that heterogeneity at the prefectural level is randomly determined
when no covariates are incorporated into the model. The estimation results, however, show
the same tendency as in Table 2, which presents the estimation result with all covariates.
Second, the results of the estimation using estimators, which are not adopted based on the
rule of using a fixed-effect estimator if the results of the Hausman test showed less than 5%
statistical significance, are shown in Table 4 when all covariates are included and in Table
5 when all covariates are excluded. In these results, the coefficients are similar to those in
Tables 2 and 3, that is, fewer going-out individuals at under and post declaration com-
pared with the pre-declaration of the state of emergency. Moreover, the most self-restraint
was shown under the declaration of the state of emergency. Third, Tables 6 and 7 show
the results of each estimation in a sample of 47 prefectures divided into two subsets: one
(N = nT = 7 × 105 = 735) consisting of the seven prefectures where a state of emergency
was declared the earliest on April 7, 2020 (Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, Hyogo,
and Fukuoka), as shown in Table 1, and the other (N = nT = 40× 105 = 4, 200) consisting
of the remaining 40 prefectures where the state of emergency was not issued on this date.
The estimators used are based on the rule that a fixed-effect estimator is used if the results
of the Hausman test show that a statistical significance is less than 5%. These results rein-
force the findings that for both the seven prefectures with the earliest emergency declaration
and the other 40 prefectures, there was less going-out behavior under and post declaration
compared with before the declaration. Moreover, the most significant self-restraint behavior
was observed under the declaration, except for the estimated result for the seven prefectures
that there was less going-out behavior for park after the emergency was lifted than under
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the declaration. These sensitivity analyses indicate that the phenomenon of a statistically
significant negative coefficient for under and post and a smaller coefficient for under than
for post is robust.
This section confirmed the following: Going-out behavior was reduced both under the
emergency declaration and after the emergency was lifted compared with the pre-declaration
of the state of emergency; in addition, going-out behavior was most suppressed under the
emergency declaration. This result clarifies two findings: First, people refrained from going
out both under the declaration and after the lifting of the state of emergency. Second, despite
the non-legally binding emergency declarations, people were more likely to refrain from going
out under the declaration of a state of emergency than after it was lifted. Therefore, this
second finding in the empirical analysis is consistent with Proposition 2 of the theoretical
analysis in Section 2. This suggests that under a declared state of emergency, people may
have acted because of the stigma of going-out as well as the risk of infection.
4 Conclusion
This study analyzes the effects of non-legally binding policies on curfews from two perspec-
tives: the construction of a micro-theoretical model and an empirical analysis using panel
data from the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports.
A plausible reason for the declaration to be effective is that people considered the risk
of infection to be high. If this were the only reason, then the effect of restraint should be
consistent when the risk of infection is constant under the declaration of an emergency and
after it is lifted. The theoretical analysis of this study assumes that under a declared state
of emergency, the going-out individual suffers psychological costs arising from both the risk
of infection and the stigma of going-out. As a result, a hypothesis is derived that under a
declared state of emergency, going out entails a strong psychological cost and people refrain
more from going out (Proposition 2).
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The empirical analysis, using a panel dataset consisting of date data on the Japanese
emergency declaration and daily human flow data as well as various covariates from Google
COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports, revealed the following two points. First, the flow
of people under the declaration of a state of emergency was suppressed. Second, although
the effect of the restraint continued after the state of emergency was lifted, the degree of
restraint was greater under the declaration of the state of emergency.
As the number of infected people in Japan is increasing again, there is a possibility that
another state of emergency will be declared. In terms of policy action in such circumstances,
the results of this study provide one policy implication by highlighting that non-legally bind-
ing policies can be effective in terms of reducing the number of people infected, that is, by
curtailing their going-out behavior.
The theoretical analysis in this study suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria—
strictly self-restraint equilibrium and not-strictly self-restraint equilibrium. In both equilib-
ria, declaring a state of emergency has the effect of reducing the number of people going out,
but the degree of effect may vary significantly. If multiple equilibria exist, while the strictly
self-restraint equilibrium was realized in Japan in reality, the not-strictly self-restraint equi-
librium could also have been realized.
Finally, there is no guarantee that the effect of the emergency declaration will always
be the same. In the theoretical model of this study, the first and subsequent declarations
of states of emergency had the same effect. On the other hand, from a social psychological
point of view, the effect may be weakened as people become accustomed a declared state of
emergency. Therefore, it is likely that the method and content of announcements would need
to be revised as they are made more often.
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Table 1: Date and length of state of emergency in the prefectures of Japan
prefecture emergency start emergency end emergency length
Hokkaido 2020-04-16 2020-05-25 39
Aomori 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Iwate 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Miyagi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Akita 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Yamagata 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Fukushima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Ibaraki 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Tochigi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Gunma 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Saitama 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Chiba 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Tokyo 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Kanagawa 2020-04-07 2020-05-25 48
Niigata 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Toyama 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Ishikawa 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Fukui 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Yamanashi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Nagano 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Gifu 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Shizuoka 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Aichi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Mie 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Shiga 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kyoto 2020-04-16 2020-05-21 35
Osaka 2020-04-07 2020-05-21 44
Hyogo 2020-04-07 2020-05-21 44
Nara 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Wakayama 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Tottori 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Shimane 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Okayama 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Hiroshima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Yamaguchi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Tokushima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kagawa 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Ehime 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kochi 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Fukuoka 2020-04-07 2020-05-14 37
Saga 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Nagasaki 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kumamoto 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Oita 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Miyazaki 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Kagoshima 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
Okinawa 2020-04-16 2020-05-14 28
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Table 2: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data
Dependent variable
retail grocery park workplace
under −19.955∗∗∗ −5.578∗∗∗ −12.884∗∗∗ −18.182∗∗∗
(0.513) (0.235) (1.544) (0.507)
post −6.410∗∗∗ −2.159∗∗∗ −7.231∗∗∗ −3.340∗∗∗
(0.387) (0.199) (1.770) (0.325)
Constant −6.067∗∗∗
(1.296)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.588 0.488 0.533 0.335
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.483 0.532 0.328
Hausman-test 1513.3∗∗∗ 73.443∗∗∗ 3.393 114.81∗∗∗
Estimator FE FE RE FE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect;
RE=random effect.
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Table 3: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis without co-
variates
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −20.143∗∗∗ −5.288∗∗∗ −10.972∗∗∗ −18.142∗∗∗
(0.640) (0.245) (1.460) (0.526)
post −5.925∗∗∗ −2.600∗∗∗ −9.664∗∗∗ −3.368∗∗∗
(0.391) (0.215) (2.071) (0.311)
Constant −7.482∗∗∗ 3.005∗∗∗ 8.421∗∗∗
(0.546) (0.240) (1.231)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.492 0.177 0.045 0.334
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.177 0.045 0.327
Hausman-test 4.586 0.093 0.045 21.868∗∗∗
Estimator RE RE RE FE
Covariates No No No No
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect;
RE=random effect.
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Table 4: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using other
estimators with covariates
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −19.991∗∗∗ −5.577∗∗∗ −12.891∗∗∗ −18.305∗∗∗
(0.519) (0.236) (1.545) (0.525)
post −6.446∗∗∗ −2.162∗∗∗ −7.232∗∗∗ −3.452∗∗∗
(0.392) (0.199) (1.773) (0.347)
Constant −8.138∗∗∗ 1.685∗∗∗ −7.925∗∗∗
(0.545) (0.281) (0.354)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.585 0.486 0.536 0.336
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.485 0.531 0.335
Hausman-test 1513.3∗∗∗ 73.443∗∗∗ 3.393 114.81∗∗∗
Estimator RE RE FE RE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect;
RE=random effect.
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Table 5: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using other
estimators without covariates
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −20.101∗∗∗ −5.286∗∗∗ −10.977∗∗∗ −18.272∗∗∗
(0.630) (0.245) (1.464) (0.555)
post −5.926∗∗∗ −2.600∗∗∗ −9.665∗∗∗ −3.364∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.215) (2.070) (0.310)
Constant −7.572∗∗∗
(0.300)
Observations 4,935 4,935 4,935 4,935
R2 0.495 0.178 0.046 0.334
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.170 0.036 0.333
Hausman-test 4.586 0.093 0.045 21.868∗∗∗
Estimator FE FE FE RE
Covariates No No No No
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect;
RE=random effect.
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Table 6: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using a subset
of the sample with the earliest state of emergency declaration
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −25.005∗∗∗ −6.341∗∗∗ −9.888∗∗∗ −23.756∗∗∗
(1.312) (0.588) (1.016) (0.729)
post −10.002∗∗∗ −2.826∗∗∗ −11.053∗∗∗ −7.739∗∗∗
(1.051) (0.590) (0.830) (0.846)
Constant −12.034∗∗∗
(2.199)
Observations 735 735 735 735
R2 0.734 0.627 0.669 0.485
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.621 0.664 0.477
Hausman-test 11.020∗ 34.235∗∗∗ 467.020∗∗∗ 1083.000∗∗∗
Estimator RE FE FE FE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect;
RE=random effect.
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Table 7: Results of empirical analysis using mobility data: sensitivity analysis using a subset
of the sample without the earliest state of emergency declaration
Dependent variable:
retail grocery park workplace
under −19.195∗∗∗ −5.480∗∗∗ −13.666∗∗∗ −17.247∗∗∗
(0.484) (0.263) (1.798) (0.429)
post −5.982∗∗∗ −2.124∗∗∗ −6.863∗∗∗ −2.715∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.213) (2.037) (0.232)
Constant −7.342∗∗∗ −6.383∗∗∗
(0.419) (1.404)
Observations 4,200 4,200 4,200 4,200
R2 0.552 0.487 0.513 0.308
Adjusted R2 0.552 0.481 0.513 0.301
Hausman-test 4.315∗ 29.896∗∗∗ 0.2385 17.459∗∗∗
Estimator RE FE RE FE
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for clustered-robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. FE=fixed effect;
RE=random effect.
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Figure 1: Example of multiple equilibria
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Figure 2: Comparison of going-out behavior in the prefectures of Japan: retail
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for retail between
pre-declaration and under-declaration (left) and post-declaration and under-declaration
(right) for three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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Figure 3: Comparison of going-out behavior in the prefectures of Japan: grocery
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for grocery between
pre-declaration and under-declaration (left) and post-declaration and under-declaration
(right) for three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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Figure 4: Comparison of going-out behavior in the prefectures of Japan: park
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for park between the
pre-declaration and under-declaration (left) and post-declaration and under-declaration
(right) for three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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Figure 5: Comparison of going-out behavior in the prefectures of Japan: workplace
Notes: The panels show the scatter plots of going-out behavior for workplace between the
pre-declaration and under-declaration (left) and post-declaration and under-declaration
(right) for three representative days: Saturday, Sunday, and Wednesday.
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